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The Battle of Shiloh:  Triumph, 
Tragedy, and the High Cost of 
War  
Kayla Scott 
The Battle of Shiloh, also known as the Battle of Pittsburg Landing, 
was one of the bloodiest battles in terms of deaths and casualties during 
the Civil War.1  Unlike the preconceived notions that the Union and 
Confederacy had held, the Battle of Shiloh was evidence that the war 
would be a long, bloody fight filled with errors.  The two-day battle 
was fought on Sunday, April 6 and Monday, April 7, 1862.2   
 Union General Ulysses S. Grant joined the Army of the 
Tennessee after they had moved to Savannah, Tennessee. 3  The 
location of the camp at Pittsburg Landing was due to General William 
Tecumseh Sherman’s recommendation of the area.   In a letter dated 
March 18, Sherman referred to the area of Pittsburg Landing as being a 
                                                          
1 David Goldfield, America Aflame: How the Civil War Created a 
Nation, (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2011), 224. 
2 G.T. Beauregard, "The Campaign of Shiloh," in Battles and Leaders 
of the Civil War. Vol. 1. eds. Robert U. Johnson and Clarence C. Buel. 
(Edison, New Jersey: Castle, n.d.), 583-593. 
3 Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant, Selected Letters 1839-1865, eds. 
Mary D. McFeely and William S. McFeely (New York: The Library of 
America, 1990), 219-224. 
“magnificent plain for camping and drilling, and a military point of 
great strength.” 4 
 After his arrival, Grant ordered his military engineer to “lay 
out a line to entrench.”5  According to Grant, it was found that 
fortification of the area was not feasible.  In addition, Grant regarded 
the construction of fortifications as time-consuming and demoralizing.  
In his memoirs, Grant justified his failure to attempt the construction of 
fortifications by saying, “The fact is, I regarded the campaign we were 
engaged in as an offensive one and had no idea that the enemy would 
leave strong entrenchments to take the initiative when he knew he 
would be attacked where he was if he remained.”  This statement shows 
that Grant was unprepared for a battle at Pittsburg Landing, despite his 
many protestations to the contrary.  Confederate General Pierre 
Gustave Toutant Beauregard later wrote that “the absence of all those 
ordinary precautions that habitually shield an army in the field must 
forbid the historian from regarding it as other than one of the most 
surprising surprises ever achieved.”6 
 In the days preceding the battle, Grant had his headquarters in 
Savannah. Grant would usually spend the day at Pittsburg Landing and 
return to Savannah in the evening.  His excuse for this practice was that 
he was waiting on General Don Carlos Buell to arrive, and that Buell 
would approach from Savannah.  “I remained at this point, therefore, a 
few days longer than I otherwise should have done, in order to meet 
him on his arrival.” 7  Grant planned to attack Corinth, Mississippi, as 
                                                          
4 Memoirs of W. T. Sherman, ed. Charles Royster (New York: Library 
of America, 1990), 252.  
5 Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant, 223-224.   
6 Beauregard, "The Campaign of Shiloh," 586. 
7 Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant, 223-224. 
soon as Buell joined him.  It is interesting to note that Grant was 
staying at an opulent estate named Cherry Mansion during his time in 
Savannah.8  Had he been on the field with his men, the 
accommodations would have been miserable in comparison.   
 Union General William T. Sherman’s hyperactive manner led 
one general to remark that he was “a splendid piece of machinery with 
all the screws a little loose.”9  In 1861, Sherman had suffered a nervous 
breakdown, going so far as to think about taking his own life.  Sherman 
was removed from command in December 1861 after his “insanity” 
had been publicized in several newspapers.  After a rest period, he was 
reinstated to a command position under Grant toward the end of 
February 1862.   
 On April 4, 1862, Captain Mason of the 77th Ohio learned that 
a large group of Confederate troops were camped a fourth of a mile 
from his position.10  Mason sent a sergeant to inform Colonel 
Hildebrand, and eventually word reached General Sherman.  Without 
investigating the matter, Sherman commanded that the sergeant be 
arrested for making a fictitious report.  Mason persuaded Hildebrand to 
come out to the field and see for himself that the report was true.  After 
witnessing the group of rebels, Captain Hildebrand went to Sherman 
and verified the presence of the Confederate troops.  Sherman 
dismissed the group as being nothing more than a scouting party.   
                                                          
8 Larry J. Daniel, Shiloh: The Battle That Changed the Civil War (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), 104. 
9 Ibid., 80.  
10 Ibid., 133-138. 
 The next day on April 5, members of the 53rd Ohio spotted 
Confederate cavalrymen toward the far edge of Rea Field, south of 
their position.11  Colonel Jesse J. Appler sent troops to investigate.  
Shots were exchanged and a message was sent to Sherman to inform 
him of the situation.  Sherman sent back a reply, telling the Colonel to 
return with his regiment to Ohio, “There is no enemy closer than 
Corinth.”12  In his memoirs, Sherman mentioned that on the day before 
he made this statement, a Union “advance picket” had left their 
assigned point and had become engaged with a small Confederate 
force.13  As the result of this skirmish, eleven Union soldiers were 
captured and eight were wounded.  Ten members of the Confederate 
Alabama Cavalry were also captured.  Beauregard mentioned this in his 
report as well, and noted that this incident “ought to have given the 
Federal general full notice that an offensive army was close behind it, 
and led to immediate preparation for our onset, including 
entrenchments.”14  However, it is clear that Sherman continued to 
ignore the size and scope of the enemy that was camped on his 
doorstep.   
 In the days leading up to the battle, Confederate forces under 
the leadership of General Albert Sidney Johnston were preparing for 
battle.  Johnston was commander-in-chief of the Confederate army at 
this point.15  Johnston’s scouts had notified him of the Union troops’ 
location beside the Tennessee River at Pittsburg Landing.16  Johnston 
felt that the Union’s choice of a camping spot held several 
                                                          
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Memoirs of W. T. Sherman, 254-255. 
14 Beauregard, "The Campaign of Shiloh," 582-583.   
15 Frank and Reaves, "Seeing the Elephant," 12. 
16 Foote, The Civil War A Narrative, 324-325. 
disadvantages, and all of them were in favor of his attack plans.  
Johnston knew that the Union army was camped facing away from the 
Tennessee River and that they were without fortifications.  Not only 
were they practically against the river, but the camps were strewn about 
in a highly disorganized manner.  On the night of April 2, 1862, 
Johnston’s second-in-command, General P.G.T. Beauregard received a 
telegram stating that Union General Lew Wallace was heading in the 
direction of Pittsburg Landing.  Beauregard sent Johnston a copy of the 
message with a note added at the end:  “Now is the moment to advance, 
and strike the enemy at Pittsburg Landing.”17  Johnston wanted to wait 
for General Earl Van Dorn to arrive.  However, General Braxton 
Bragg, who had recently been made chief of staff, agreed with 
Beauregard that the time to act was at hand.  On April 3, 1862, General 
Albert Sidney Johnston sent a battle order to the Army of the 
Mississippi in Corinth.18  The battle order began with the words, “I 
have put you in motion to offer battle to the invaders of your 
country.”19  He went on to remind the troops to, “Remember the 
dependence of your mothers, your wives, your sisters, and your 
children on the result.”  Johnston also noted that “The eyes and hopes 
of 8,000,000 of people rest upon you.”20  On the morning of April 3, 
Beauregard’s chief of staff began writing the marching orders using 
notes from General Beauregard and a copy of Napoleon’s Waterloo 
order for a model.  It is remarkable that a copy of the Waterloo order 
was used when that particular battle had met with such disastrous 
results.   
                                                          
17 Ibid. 
18 Bromfield L. Ridley, Battles and Sketches of the Army of Tennessee 
(Dayton, Ohio: Press of Morningside Bookshop, 1978), 82. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ridley, Battles and Sketches of the Army of Tennessee, 82. 
 The Battle of Shiloh was originally planned to begin on the 
morning of Friday, April 4.21  The planning meeting lasted until 10 
a.m. on April 3, four hours after the twenty-mile march was supposed 
to begin.  When at last the army began to leave Corinth, a ‘traffic jam’ 
ensued.  In no time, the roads of Corinth were blocked by a tangled 
mass of men, wagons, artillery, and horses.  General Polk was the first 
to break free of the madness.  He might have made some headway, 
except General William J. Hardee had to leave first for the proper order 
to be observed.  When General Leonidas Polk was finally able to leave, 
it was past sunset.  He and his men managed to travel only nine miles 
before calling it a night.  General Bragg, in the meantime, had met with 
about equal success.  In light of these events, the schedule for battle 
was moved up an entire day, and planned for the date of Saturday, 
April 5.   
 As the march progressed on April 5, so did the rain.  After a 
short time, the mud became “shin deep.”22  Traveling was sporadic at 
best, with countless setbacks and interruptions.  At this point, Bragg 
was still in trouble.  He was late reaching his position at Monterey by 
about a half a day.  Even now, he was missing an entire division that 
had somehow been left behind.  Bragg’s tardiness forced General Polk 
to call a halt in order for Bragg to catch up.  Matters were not helped in 
the least when things became tangled again on the roads to and from an 
area called Mickey’s.   
 General Albert Sidney Johnston arrived on the scene early the 
next morning expecting to see everything in order and the troops ready 
                                                          
21 Foote, The Civil War A Narrative, 326. 
22 Ibid., 327-328. 
for battle.23  The scene he witnessed held no order, and the only 
division that was located even remotely close to where it was supposed 
to be was led by General Hardee.  Bragg and his men finally came 
straggling in, minus the still-missing division.  As everyone was getting 
into position, some of the soldiers became concerned that the powder in 
their guns might have been affected by the previous night’s rain.  
Several men decided to test their guns, and the shots were close enough 
to the Union camp to be heard.  Add a few “rebel yells” and the fact 
that ten Confederates had been caught by the Union during the previous 
night, and the entire element of surprise should have been lost.  At 
12:30 p.m., Bragg’s lost division had yet to be found.  Johnston finally 
located the division behind Polk’s men.  It was 2 p.m. by the time all of 
Bragg’s troops were in place.  By 4 p.m. Polk’s men were lined up, but 
Breckinridge was not yet in position.   
 There had been so many setbacks and so much trouble, that 
the question of scrapping the whole mission was raised.24  After finding 
Generals Beauregard, Bragg, and Polk having a discussion about 
abandoning the plan to attack, General Johnston held an impromptu 
council of war.  Beauregard was adamantly in favor of abandoning the 
idea of battle because the element of surprise had been lost.  
Beauregard later wrote that he felt his recommendation to abandon the 
plan to attack was “based on sound military principles.” 25  
Breckinridge arrived during the discussion, adding his vote to carry out 
the plan to attack with those of Bragg and Polk.  The battle would take 
place beginning at daybreak the following day.  Orders were given to 
                                                          
23 Foote, The Civil War A Narrative, 328-329. 
24 Ibid., 329. 
25 Beauregard, "The Campaign of Shiloh," 569-593.   
finish forming the lines of battle, and to camp in that position for the 
night.26   
 Confederate and Union forces held severely exaggerated 
estimates of the number of troops the other side had.  Correspondences 
and journal records from March 21 through March 29 highlight just 
how over-inflated the numbers were.27  Confederates estimated that 
Grant had 100,000 soldiers posted at Pittsburg Landing.  Buell was 
supposed to have 50,000 en route to join Grant.  In reality, the troops 
under Grant numbered 42,682, not 100,000.28  Buell’s command was 
30,000 strong instead of 50,000.  In turn, Union forces also imagined a 
much larger army than the one that existed.  Somewhere between 
70,000 and 125,000 Confederate troops were thought to be organizing 
in Corinth during late March.29  In reality, Johnston had seventy-one 
regiments and sixteen brigades at his disposal, totaling 40,335 men.30  
Without Buell’s army, Union and Confederate forces were almost 
evenly matched in numbers, but neither side knew this.   
 Before sunrise on the morning of April 6, Colonel Everett 
Peabody of Brigadier General Prentiss’ command sent a group of 
soldiers out to patrol the area.31  As the first rays of sun lit the day, the 
Union patrol spotted a lone figure on horseback some distance away in 
Fraley’s field.  Shortly thereafter, Confederates opened fire on the 
Union patrol from their position in the woods across this field.  The 
Union patrol returned fire, quickly realized that they were heavily 
                                                          
26 Foote, The Civil War A Narrative, 329. 
27 Frank and Reaves, "Seeing the Elephant," 77. 
28 Foote, The Civil War A Narrative, 324. 
29 Frank and Reaves, "Seeing the Elephant," 77. 
30 Foote, The Civil War A Narratiive, 324. 
31 Frank and Reaves, "Seeing the Elephant," 12. 
outnumbered, and hastily returned to camp.  The element of surprise for 
a Confederate attack was now completely lost.   
 General Prentiss arrived in Colonel Peabody’s camp in time 
see the Colonel readying the regiments of the 25th Missouri and 12th 
Michigan for battle with the nearby Confederate forces.32  Instead of 
expressing his horror at Peabody’s plight, Prentiss asked Peabody if he 
had “provoked” an engagement by ordering an unauthorized patrol.  
Peabody explained that he had tried to contact Prentiss before sending 
out the patrol.  Prentiss replied, “Colonel Peabody, I will hold you 
personally responsible for bringing on this engagement.” 33 This was an 
incredibly absurd statement.  Prentiss should have been thanking 
Peabody for alerting the Union army to the attack that was going to 
happen with or without provocation that day.  Later that morning 
Colonel Everett Peabody suffered his fifth wound, resulting in his 
instant death.34  Peabody’s officers found his body on April 7 and 
buried him.  They left a wooden marker at his grave inscribed with the 
words, “A braver man ne’er died upon the field.” 35  Peabody had been 
responsible for alerting Union forces that an enemy attack was coming, 
stealing the last vestiges of surprise from the Confederate forces.  He 
died without getting the credit he deserved.   
 Early on the morning of the April 6, Grant heard the sounds of 
battle as he was eating breakfast.36  He made the trip to Pittsburg 
Landing, which was nine miles down the Tennessee River from his 
                                                          
32 Wiley Sword. Shiloh: Bloody April (Dayton, Ohio: Press of 
Morningside Bookshop, 1974), 151.  
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 163.   
35 Ibid., 421.   
36 Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant, 225-226.   
location in Savannah.37  Grant stopped en route at Crump’s Landing to 
alert General Lew Wallace and his division to be ready to receive 
orders.  He arrived at the landing around 8:00 a.m., approximately three 
hours after the battle had begun.  When Grant witnessed the conflict 
taking place, he sent an order to Wallace, telling him to come to 
Pittsburg Landing immediately. 38  It is not clear whether the order 
became confused or was disobeyed.  At any rate, Lew Wallace’s 
division didn’t see any action during the first day of battle.  He and his 
5,000 men appeared in the area of Pittsburg Landing after the fighting 
had ended for the day.   
 Meanwhile, Sherman, who was present at Pittsburg Landing 
the entire time, had been in denial.  Sherman was aware that fighting 
was taking place in the area early on the morning of April 6, but it was 
quite some time before he acknowledged the truth of the situation.39  In 
Sherman’s report of the day’s battle, he states that, “About 8 A.M. I 
saw the glistening bayonets of heavy masses of infantry to our left front 
in the woods…and became satisfied for the first time that the enemy 
designed a determined attack on our whole camp.”  This moment of 
enlightenment on Sherman’s part came after the fighting had been 
going on for approximately three hours.40   
 Shiloh Church was located around two or three miles away 
from Pittsburg Landing.  This little log meeting house is where one of 
the battle’s names came from.  Ironically, the name Shiloh comes from 
                                                          
37 Frank and Reaves, "Seeing the Elephant," 13-14. 
38 Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant, 226-233. 
39 Memoirs of W. T. Sherman, 255-256.  
40 Ridley, Battles and Sketches of the Army of Tennessee, 88-89. 
the Bible and means “tranquil” or “place of peace.”41  As the battle 
began on the morning of April 6, General Sherman held what Grant 
referred to as the “key” point with his position near the church.42  
General John McClernand held a position to the left of Sherman.  
Located to the left of McClernand was General Benjamin Prentiss with 
his division.  On Prentiss’s left was a single brigade of Sherman’s 
division led by Stuart.  General Stephen A. Hurlbut was positioned 
behind Prentiss as a reserve force.  General C. F. Smith’s division, 
under the leadership of Brigadier General W. H. L. Wallace, was 
stationed to Hurlbut’s right.  The majority of these divisions were made 
up of raw troops, men who had never experienced battle.   
 The area of battle around the Union encampment at Pittsburg 
Landing was approximately three miles long and three miles wide, with 
ravines along the edges that limited maneuverability.43  Due to the 
position of the Union army in relation to the Snake, Lick, and Owl 
Creeks, Confederate forces launched a frontal attack.44  Confederate 
General P.G.T Beauregard described the entire battlefield as being 
interwoven with ravines and covered with trees and underbrush, 
“except for a few scattered farm fields of from fifty to seventy-five 
acres.”45  Beauregard wrote that the “recent rains had made all these 
depressions boggy and difficult for the movement of artillery across 
them.”46   
                                                          
41 Goldfield, America Aflame, 228. 
42 Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant, 226-227. 
43 Frank and Reaves, "Seeing the Elephant," 88. 
44 Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant, 227. 
45 Beauregard, "The Campaign of Shiloh," 585.   
46 Ibid. 
 Sometime after 10:00 a.m., Grant came across Prentiss at what 
later was called the Sunken Road.  Prentiss had been pushed back from 
his original position, but had managed to get a foothold at this worn 
road that was bordered by dense trees.  Grant gave General Prentiss the 
order to “maintain that position at all hazards.” 47  As the battle 
increased in ferocity, the area of the Sunken Road earned a second 
name:  The Hornet’s Nest.   
 By 12:00 p.m., the soldiers on the field were mixed together to 
the point that many had lost their commanders and even their 
regiments.48  As the battle raged, all Union positions were being forced 
back toward Pittsburg Landing.  The original plan had been to drive the 
Union forces up against Snake Creek, but this proved unattainable.   
 To the extreme edge of the Hornet’s Nest was the peach 
orchard where Union General Hurlbut and his division were fighting 
that afternoon.49  Breckinridge had just attempted a charge against 
Hurlbut, without success, when General Albert Sidney Johnston came 
along.  Rallying the men, he led a second charge on Hurlbut’s position 
that proved successful.  The peach orchard, along with the guns in it, 
was now in the hands of the Confederates.   
 Isham G. Harris, who was the governor of Tennessee when the 
war broke out, served with Albert Sidney Johnston at Shiloh.50  Upon 
returning from delivering orders from Johnston to Colonel Winfield 
Statham, Harris found General Johnston swaying in the saddle of his 
                                                          
47 Foote, The Civil War A Narrative, 336-339. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Foote, The Civil War A Narrative, 336-339. 
50 Ridley, Battles and Sketches of the Army of Tennessee, 92. 
horse.51  When Harris asked if he was wounded, General Johnston 
answered, “Yes, and I fear seriously.”  Johnston had been wounded 
after approximately ten hours of battle.52  Aided by Captain W. L. 
Wickham, Isham Harris moved Johnston to a nearby ravine in an effort 
to shield them from gunfire.53  General Albert Sidney Johnston died at 
2:30 p.m. on April 6.54  A Miniè ball had penetrated his right leg at a 
point slightly below his knee, damaging the poplitial artery.55  Johnston 
might have been saved if his wound had received proper attention.  
Confederate private Sam Watkins and his 1st Tennessee regiment 
passed through the area during the time of Johnston’s death.  In his 
memoirs, Watkins recalled seeing Johnston encircled by his staff.  “We 
saw some little commotion among those who surrounded him, but we 
did not know at the time he was dead.”   According to Watkins, “The 
fact was kept from the troops.” 56  Lieutenant George W. Baylor was a 
part of the group that surrounded Johnston.57  “General Johnston was 
such a lovable man that his staff as well as his soldiers worshipped 
him; and his staff seemed stupefied with grief at the great calamity,” 
wrote Baylor.  If Johnston had not ordered his staff surgeon, Dr. 
Yandall, to attend to Union prisoners, the general would have had a 
doctor with him during the fatal incident.  Johnston’s body, covered by 
a blanket, was carried to Shiloh Church.58  Those who asked were told 
                                                          
51 Charles Pierce Roland, Albert Sidney Johnston: Soldier of Three 
Republics (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964), 336-338.   
52 Ridley, Battles and Sketches of the Army of Tennessee, 85. 
53 Roland, Albert Sidney Johnston, 336.   
54 Ridley, Battles and Sketches of the Army of Tennessee, 88. 
55 Roland, Albert Sidney Johnston, 336.   
56 Sam R. Watkins, Co. Aytch: A Confederate Memoir of the Civil War 
(New York: Touchstone Books, 1997), 42.   
57 Time-Life Books, ed. Voices of the Civil War: Shiloh. (Richmond: 
Time Life, Inc., 1996), 123. 
58 Roland, Albert Sidney Johnston, 336-338.   
that the covered body was Colonel Jackson from Texas.  Union General 
William T. Sherman noted in his memoirs that there was “a perceptible 
lull for a couple of hours” around the time of Johnston’s death.59  
General P. G. T. Beauregard first heard of General Johnston’s death a 
short time past 3:00 p.m.60  As soon as he learned of the tragic news, 
Beauregard took command of the Confederate forces.61   
 After twelve attempts had been made by the Confederates to 
overrun the Hornet’s Nest, Beauregard sent in General Daniel 
Ruggles.62  Ruggles posted a battery of sixty-two cannon on the 
Sunken Road, forcing Union soldiers to retreat toward Pittsburg 
Landing.63  W. H. L. Wallace received a fatal wound while trying to 
rally his troops in the area of the Hornet’s Nest.64  With the loss of their 
leader, his command broke and retreated along with Hurlbut’s men.  
Prentiss held on, even when it would have been advisable to retreat, 
and was captured at approximately 5:00 p.m. on April 6.65  He and his 
2,200 men were forced to surrender.  Prentiss was a prisoner of war 
until October 1862.66  He resigned in 1863 after holding some rather 
insignificant command positions.   
 Many soldiers were saved by the bullet striking some object 
they were carrying. One soldier told of a bullet striking his gun and 
penetrating his rifle, only to end up buried in the small Bible that he 
                                                          
59 Memoirs of W. T. Sherman, 268.  
60 Beauregard, "The Campaign of Shiloh," 590. 
61 Ridley, Battles and Sketches of the Army of Tennessee, 85. 
62 Foote, The Civil War A Narrative, 336-339. 
63 Roland, Albert Sidney Johnston, 339. 
64 Foote, The Civil War A Narrative, 336-339. 
65 Roland, Albert Sidney Johnston, 339. 
66 David G. Martin, The Shiloh Campaign: March-April 1862 Revised 
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had in the pocket of his coat.  James Griffin of the 5th Washington 
Artillery later wrote that he would have been killed, “had it not been for 
the very large knife I carried in my breast pocket.” 67  Another soldier 
was saved by his belt buckle when a musket ball struck it instead of 
him.  When struck by a spent ball, a soldier named Warren Olney 
thought himself “mortally wounded” and literally began to run for his 
life.  After running for a bit, he “began to suspect a man shot through 
the body couldn’t make such speed.”68  Upon inspection he found the 
spent ball in the material of his clothes, and realized he suffered from 
nothing worse than bruised ribs.   
 The effects of battle were devastating on the nerves of men in 
the field.  Many men, especially the raw troops, ran for cover once the 
fighting broke out.69  After the battle, George McBride of the 15th 
Michigan recounted his experience of seeing shot from the cannons 
rolling along the ground.  McBride later wrote that the sight “impressed 
me with a desire to get out of there.” 70  He went on to say, “The hair 
now commenced to rise on the back of my head…and I felt sure that a 
cannon-ball was close behind me, giving me chase as I started for the 
river.  In my mind, it was a race between me and that cannon-ball.”  
Leander Stillwell summed up the feelings of most of the men engaged 
at Shiloh with his observations after the battle.  “I am not ashamed to 
say…that I would willingly have given a general quit-claim deed for 
                                                          
67 Frank and Reaves, "Seeing the Elephant," 106-115.   
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid., 112-119.   
70 Ibid., 112-119. 
every jot and title of military glory falling to me…if I only could have 
been miraculously…set down…a thousand miles away.”71   
 While most soldiers freely admitted that they experienced fear 
on the battlefield, they managed to hold their ground without retreating.  
Some later wrote that they had been energized in the face of battle.  
Confederate soldier Sam R. Watkins, a private with the 1st Tennessee, 
felt elated when he was ordered into the battle.  “I felt happier than a 
fellow does when he professes religion at a big Methodist camp-
meeting,” wrote Watkins. 72    
 Union forces retreated to the area of Pittsburg Landing after 
6:00 p.m.73  According to Beauregard, by the time the battle began to 
wind down on the first day, Confederate troops were either very low or 
totally out of ammunition.74  Beauregard gave orders for fighting to end 
for the night at 6:00 p.m.  According to him, several regiments had 
already retreated from the field of battle before they were given the 
order to cease.  He described his commanding officers as being 
satisfied with the day’s progress.  Accounts written by Private Sam 
Watkins and other soldiers disprove that statement.  However, 
Beauregard claimed that no mention was made about the possibility of 
accomplishing more if the battle had continued later into the night.  The 
Confederates were victorious at this point.  Beauregard sent a message 
that night to Richmond declaring a “complete victory, driving the 
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73 Ibid., 89.  
74 Beauregard, "The Campaign of Shiloh," 591.   
enemy from every position.”75  He spent the night in Sherman’s 
abandoned tent.76   
 During the evening of April 6, Beauregard received word that 
Union reinforcements under General Buell had been delayed and would 
not arrive in time to help General Grant.77  As the evening wore on, a 
torrential downpour soaked the men and the area, paving the way for a 
muddy and uncomfortable night.  Conditions for battle the next day 
were significantly exacerbated by this storm.  The wooden gunboats 
Tyler and Lexington, commanded by Lieutenant Gwin and Lieutenant 
Shirk, continuously fired shells directly onto the area of the field where 
the Confederates were camped for the night.78  At 9:00 a.m. the Tyler 
had begun firing every ten minutes.  The Lexington took over at 1:00 
a.m. and continued to fire every seventeen minutes until 5:30 a.m.  
There were also the cries of the wounded and dying.  “Oh, what a night 
of horrors that was!!  It will haunt me to the grave,” wrote a soldier 
from the 38th Tennessee.79  All these factors added up to a miserable 
and sleepless night for the Army of the Mississippi.   
 Colonel Nathan Bedford Forrest was not wasting his time with 
sleep on the night of April 6.  He had sent some of his men dressed as 
Union soldiers down to Pittsburg Landing for reconnaissance. 80  When 
the spies returned, they told Forrest of the large number of fresh Union 
troops arriving at the landing.  Colonel Forrest woke Brigadier General 
James R. Chalmers, who instructed him to tell someone of higher rank.  
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Forrest then went to General Hardee, who told him to visit Beauregard.  
Forrest searched for Beauregard for some time, but was unable to find 
him.  Forrest went back to General Hardee, who simply told him to go 
back to his regiment and maintain his position.  Beauregard never 
received this important information.  A rumor later circulated that 
Beauregard had hidden in a tent at times during the two days of 
battle.81   
 According to Buell, he himself arrived in Savannah on the 
evening of April 5.82  General Nelson of his command had reached 
Savannah before him and set up camp.  The other divisions were on 
their way, with General Crittenden being closest.  Buell later said that 
he did not see Grant on the 5th, but that Nelson reported a visit from 
Grant on that day.  In his conversation with Nelson, Grant had 
expressed complete confidence that a battle would not occur at 
Pittsburg Landing.  Grant notes this meeting with Nelson in his 
memoirs, saying that he put Nelson in position to move to Pittsburg or 
Crump’s Landing, whichever was necessary when the time came.83  
Grant claimed that Buell arrived without informing him of his arrival, a 
point that Buell disputed.  Buell later expressed his disgust over Grant’s 
“boastful” comments concerning Buell’s part in the battle.84  “Victory 
was assured when Lew Wallace arrived, even if there had been no other 
support,” wrote Grant.  “I was glad, however, to see the reinforcements 
of Buell and credit them with doing all there was for them to do.”85  
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This statement was completely at odds with a message that Grant had 
sent addressed to “The Commanding Officer, Advance Forces” during 
the first day of battle.86  In the message, Grant stated, “If you will get 
upon the field leaving all your baggage on the East bank of the river it 
will be a move to our advantage and possibly save the day to us.” 
 Buell met with General Sherman on the evening of April 6 and 
asked several questions about the conditions at Shiloh.  Sherman later 
wrote, “Buell seemed to mistrust us, and repeatedly said that he did not 
like the looks of things, especially about the boat-landing.”87  Sherman 
continued, “I really feared he would not cross over his army that night, 
lest he become involved in our general disaster.”  In reply to Sherman’s 
doubt, Buell noted, “One would suppose that his fears would have been 
allayed by the fact that, at that very moment, my troops were arriving 
and covering his front as fast as legs and steamboats could carry 
them.”88 
 The fighting began at 5:20 a.m. on April 7 when Nelson’s 
division advanced on the River Road.89  Confederate forces struggled 
to put together a line of attack.  There were, at the very most, 20,000 
members of the infantry available on the morning of the April 7. 90  The 
Confederate army had received no respite the night before while the 
Union troops were rested.  Buell’s army, along with General Lew 
Wallace’s reinforcements, equaled approximately 33,000 fresh troops 
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for the Union side.91  After several hours of fighting, it became evident 
to Beauregard that the Union was being continuously reinforced with 
fresh men.  “Accordingly at 1 p.m. I determined to withdraw from so 
unequal a conflict, securing such of the results of the victory of the day 
before as was then practicable,” wrote Beauregard in his report.92   
 At 2:00 p.m. the advance lines of the Confederate forces 
withdrew.93  The Union army made no pursuit.  Torrential rains 
occurred once again on the evening of April 7 and persisted the entire 
night.  Sherman later explained that letting the Confederates get away 
unimpeded was necessary.94  The men were so exhausted from two 
days of heavy fighting that it was impossible to follow the rebels when 
they retreated.  The battle of Shiloh was over, but the aftermath 
remained to be dealt with.   
 There were more soldiers killed and wounded at Shiloh than 
the total number of men lost during the Revolutionary War, the 
Mexican War, and the War of 1812 combined.95  Sherman gave the 
number of Union men lost as being 1,700 killed, 7,495 wounded, and 
3,022 taken prisoner with 12,217 in all.96  Of the total, 2,167 were from 
Buell’s army, with the remaining 10,050 coming from Grant’s army.  
Out of Sherman’s corps alone, sixteen officers were killed, forty-five 
were wounded, and six were missing.  From the ranks of the soldiers, 
302 were killed, 1,230 were wounded, and 435 were missing.  In all, 
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Sherman lost the service of 2,034 men.  Beauregard counted the loss 
from the Army of the Mississippi as being 10,699.97 
 Grant was condemned for being away from Pittsburg Landing 
and his men when the battle began.98  Rumors flew concerning Grant’s 
conduct at Shiloh.  Grant was accused of being caught off guard, which 
was true, whether he ever admitted it or not.  Grant was also accused of 
being drunk before and during the battle, but there was no proof that he 
was ever inebriated while in the Savannah area.  Some thought Grant 
should hang for his negligence.  The general public opinion was that 
Grant needed to be replaced.  President Lincoln refused to remove 
Grant from the Union army, saying, “I can’t spare this man; he 
fights.”99  Grant was promoted to second-in-command, a post that one 
author calls “meaningless.”  Grant noted himself that the post made 
him, “little more than an observer.”  He was eventually given a true 
leadership position commanding the District of West Tennessee.   
 After Shiloh, Buell’s allegiance was called into question and 
his actions strongly criticized.100  Buell’s tardiness to Shiloh was a 
point of severe contention.  He had taken twenty-three days to get his 
army 123 miles from Nashville to Savannah.101  Recent rains had 
forced Buell to ford two rivers, with one of these, the Duck River, 
causing a twelve day halt.  This information, however, did not seem to 
be enough to satisfy the Federal government.  Buell was removed from 
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commanding the Army of the Ohio on October 24, 1862.102  Buell was 
later offered a lesser command, but refused to serve under anyone he 
had ever outranked in authority.103  He handed in his resignation on 
June 1, 1864.104    
 As for the soldiers that had been on the battlefield at Shiloh, 
those who had survived would always remember the experience.  When 
writing about Shiloh, Sam Watkins stated, “I never realized the “pomp 
and circumstance” of the thing called glorious war until I saw this.” 105  
One officer of the 16th Wisconsin wrote after Shiloh, “I had no 
conception of [war]…no pen can describe, nor imagination conceive, 
the intensity of horror that has been presented us.”106   
 The Union soldiers were left the task of burying the 
Confederate dead.  Many of the fallen soldiers were placed in mass 
trenches.  These trenches “were dug about six feet wide and three to 
four feet deep.  Old blankets were thrown over the pile of bodies and 
the earth thrown on top.” 107  Others were dumped into ravines and 
gullies with, “merely a few shovels of loose dirt upon them.”  The dead 
were still being buried a week after the battle.   
 There were many soldiers who continued to believe that the 
war would be over soon after the Battle of Shiloh.  There were others 
who believed that Shiloh would not be the last major battle of the war, 
by far.  John V. Mosley of the 16th Wisconsin wrote, “Some of the men 
                                                          
102 Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant, 1180.  
103 Ibid., 472-473.  
104 Ibid., 1180.   
105 Watkins, Co. Aytch, 40-45.   
106 Frank and Reaves, "Seeing the Elephant," 115-120. 
107 Ibid., 122-123.   
think that we will be home by the first of July.  I hope so but I think 
differently.  This rebellion is too deeply seated to be soon 
eradicated.”108  Confederate surgeon Dr. L. Yandell wrote, “Those 
persons who reason themselves into the belief that peace will soon 
come or at least that the war will soon cease, are blinded and misled by 
their wishes.”  Those who believed that the war was far from over were 
correct.  It would be the middle of 1865 before the last battle was 
fought.109   
 The Battle of Shiloh was the bloodiest battle that had ever 
happened on American soil, and continues to be known as one of the 
worst battles of the Civil War.110  Many mistakes and errors of 
judgment were made at Shiloh, and they were not the last to occur 
during the war.  The Union had thought that they could easily put down 
the Southern rebellion, but Shiloh showed that the South would not be 
easily taken.  In turn, the Confederacy was shown that the cost of 
freedom from the Union was going to be high.  The Battle of Shiloh 
proved that neither side would be giving up without a fight.
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